Ricart-Huguet, Joan. 2019. Democracy in Africa: Historical Pitfalls and Contemporary Developments. In: Ewout Frankema, Ellen Hillbom and Felix Meier zu Selhausen (eds.), The History of African Development, African Economic History Network (AEHN). Forthcoming.
Ricart-Huguet, Joan, and Elliott Green. 2018. “Taking It Personally: The Effect of Ethnic Attachment on Preferences for Regionalism” Studies in Comparative International Development 53 (1) : 67-89.
This paper presents three related findings on regional decentralization. We use an original dataset collected in Uganda to establish, for the first time in a developing country context, that individuals have meaningful preferences over the degree of regional decentralization they desire, ranging from centralism to secessionism. Second, multilevel models suggest that a small share of this variation is explained at the district and ethnic group levels. The preference for regional decentralization monotonically increases with a group or district's average ethnic attachment. However, the relationship with a group or district's income is U-shaped: both the richest and the poorest groups desire more regionalism, reconciling interest and identity-based explanations. Finally, we show that higher individual ethnic attachment causes an increase in regionalist preferences using fixed effects and a new matching method for general treatment regimes.
Weinreb, Jason, and Joan Ricart-Huguet. 2014. “A correction to Potters and van Winden (1992)” Public Choice 159 (1) : 23–26.
This note amends the model of informational lobbying presented in Potters and van Winden (Public Choice 74:269–292, 1992). In the original article, the authors find that only separating and pooling equilibria exist when the cost of lobbying is intermediate and the policymaker’s prior favors the interest group’s preferred policy. However, we prove that a semi-separating equilibrium also exists under these conditions. Implications for lobbying behavior are discussed.